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Robert T. Carlton, Jr. (Argued)
McAleese, McGoldrick & Susanin
455 South Gulph Road
Suite 240 - Executive Terrace
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
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---------OPINION OF THE COURT
----------

GARTH, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Hartford Fire Insurance Company is
the surety on a labor and material payment bond purchased by Mele
Construction Co., Inc. ("Mele").

Hartford's bond required

prospective claimants who were not in a "direct contract" with
Mele to give written notice of their claims within 90 days after
they ceased work.

Plaintiffs-appellees, tardy claimants on

Hartford's bond, are the International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 542 and Michael J. Ragan as administrator of
various "fringe benefit" funds associated with Local 542
(collectively, "Local 542").
Local 542 had a collective bargaining agreement with
Tri-County Excavating, Inc., a corporation owned by the three
daughters of John Mele, president of Mele.

Hartford rejected

Local 542's claim, made roughly 120 days after Local 542 ceased
work, because Local 542 was not in a "direct contract" with Mele
and so was required to give notice of its claim within 90 days of
the last labor performed.

Local 542 responded that Tri-County
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was the corporate "alter ego" of Mele, and that inasmuch as Local
542 had contracted with Tri-County it had, ipso facto, contracted
with Mele.
Following a bench trial, the district court held that
Tri-County was indeed the alter ego/instrumentality of Mele and
entered judgment in favor of Local 542.

The district court held

that under the terms of the bond Hartford was liable to Local 542
for Tri-County's unpaid "fringe benefit" contributions, union
dues, liquidated damages and attorney fees.
On appeal, Hartford advances three arguments: first,
that the district court erred in its alter ego determination
under Pennsylvania law; second, that the Employees Retirement
Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 ("ERISA"), preempts
Local 542's state-law action on the bond; and third, that the
bond does not obligate Hartford to pay liquidated damages and
attorney fees.
We agree with all of the district court's holdings
except its holding that Hartford was obliged to pay liquidated
damages and attorney fees.

Consequently, we will affirm the

district court's award of unpaid fringe benefit contributions and
union dues.

However, because we conclude that Hartford cannot be

held liable for attorney fees and liquidated damages, we will
reverse so much of the district court's orders of March 2, 1994,
and February 15, 1995, as granted judgment against Hartford for
those damages.

We will accordingly remand to the district court

with directions that its judgment against Hartford and in favor
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of Local 542 on Count IV be modified to delete all awards of
attorney fees and liquidated damages.

I.
Mele purchased the bond ("the Bond") from Hartford to
cover Mele's wage and labor obligations in connection with earth
work which Mele was hired to perform on Crown America
Corporation's Viewmont Mall project in Lackawanna County,
Pennsylvania.

Crown is named as obligee on the bond.

For the past twenty years Mele, which owns heavy earth
moving equipment, has sub-contracted with Tri-County on a job-byjob basis whereby Tri-County provided operating engineers to
operate Mele's earth moving equipment.

Tri-County is part of a

group of at least five companies owned by the extended Mele
family.
Under its contracts with with Mele, Tri-County would
furnish Mele with Tri-County employees who were members of Local
542.

Tri-County and its employees were subject to the terms of a

Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"), negotiated between Local
542 and Tri-County in 1988, and a Pension Fund Agreement ("PFA")
entered into between Local 542 and the General Building
Contractors Association and the Contractors Association of
Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware in 1974.
When Crown hired Mele for the Viewmont project in the
Summer of 1990, Mele looked to Tri-County for operating engineers
and, as it had done in the past, Tri-County engaged members of
Local 542 pursuant to the CBA and PFA.
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As is particularly

relevant to the present dispute, the CBA obligated Tri-County to
make regular "fringe benefit" contributions to Local 542's
Pension, Health and Welfare, Apprenticeship, Training and Safety,
Supplemental Unemployment Benefit, and Annuity funds (the
"Funds") during the time that Local 542 members were in TriCounty's employ.

The CBA also required Tri-County to pay

"supplemental union dues" and provided for the payment of a
specific monetary penalty should Tri-County become delinquent in
its fringe benefit contributions.

The PFA provided that in the

event of a lawsuit against an employer to collect unpaid
contributions, the employer was obliged to pay costs and
reasonable attorney fees.
Work on the Viewmont project commenced some time in
August of 1990, and Tri-County began making the required fringe
benefit contributions to the Funds as required by the CBA.
The Viewmont project foundered in the spring of 1991,
with disastrous results:

Crown stopped paying Mele, Mele fell

behind in progress payments to Tri-County, and Tri-County in turn
failed to make the fringe benefit contributions to the Funds for
the period March-June, 1991.

Within months, Mele had filed for

bankruptcy and Tri-County became insolvent.

By this time the

Funds were owed roughly $78,000.00 in unpaid contributions.
On or about November 1, 1991, Local 542, having been
informed by Tri-County that it was unable to satisfy its
obligations to the Funds, turned to Hartford for payment.
Hartford's Bond contained the following provision:
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No suit or action shall be commenced
hereunder by any claimant, (a) unless
claimant, other than one having a direct
contract with the principal, shall have given
written notice to any two of the following:
the principal, the owner or the surety. . .,
within ninety days after such claimant did or
performed the last of the work or labor . . .
for which said claim is made.
App. 97 (emphasis added).
Under this provision, all claimants who had not
contracted directly with Mele were required to give written
notice to any two of Mele, Hartford or Crown within 90 days after
ceasing work.
As shown by Tri-County records, the "last labor"
provided by Local 542 on the Viewmont job was for the week ending
June 28, 1991.

Local 542 did not give notice of its claim until

on or about November 1, 1991, more than 120 days after "last
labor" was performed.

Hartford rejected Local 542's request on

the ground that Local 542 had failed to make timely notice of its
claim.
On January 3, 1992, Local 542 commenced this action in
the federal district court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania on the basis of diversity of citizenship, seeking
delinquent fringe benefit contributions, union dues, liquidated
damages and attorney fees.0

Local 542 claimed that Tri-County

0

Also named as defendants in Local 542's complaint were TriCounty (Counts I and II) and United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Company ("USF&G"), another surety for Mele on a different
construction project (Count III). Tri-County did not defend
itself below, and a default judgment was entered against TriCounty in the district court. Tri-County has not appealed.
Sometime following the commencement of this action
Local 542 and USF&G entered into a settlement agreement and Local
7

was Mele's alter ego, and that Local 542 was therefore in a
"direct contract" with Mele and so was not subject to the bond's
90 day notice provision.
The district court agreed with Local 542.

Following a

bench trial, the district court, by order dated March 2, 1994,
entered judgment against Hartford and awarded Local 542
$78,794.79 in unpaid fringe benefit contributions, $5,719.11 in
unpaid union dues, and $42,190.21 in liquidated damages, less
$480.00 in prepayment.

The district court also awarded

reasonable attorney fees to Local 542, but did not quantify those
fees until it entered its order of February 15, 1995, which set
attorney fees at $19,881.73.
Hartford appealed from the district court's March 2,
1994 order on March 29, 1994, and timely appealed the February
15, 1995 order.0
II. Appellate Jurisdiction
As noted above, the district court's March 2, 1994
order entered judgment in favor of Local 542 and among other
things awarded reasonable attorney fees but did not quantify the
542 dismissed its action against USF&G pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). Accordingly, the instant appeal
concerns only Count IV of the Complaint, naming Hartford as
defendant.
0
After the district court entered its order quantifying attorney
fees, Hartford filed another appeal at docket no. 95-1189 which
challenged the award itself, but did not contest the amount of
fees awarded. That appeal was limited to "the issue of the
Benefit Funds' entitlement to attorney fees as previously briefed
and argued," (Stipulation of Counsel for Consolidation of
Appeals, ¶ 9), and has been consolidated with the present appeal.
Both parties agreed that the issue raised in 95-1189 with respect
to attorney fees is identical to the attorney fees issue raised
in the earlier appeal at 94-1388.
8

amount of those fees.

Although Hartford appealed the March 2,

1994 order on March 29, 1994, it was not until February 15, 1995
that the district court entered an order setting attorney fees at
$19,881.73.

Neither party questioned the jurisdiction of this

court to hear Hartford's appeal.

However, we must consider our

appellate jurisdiction as a threshold matter.

See Trent Realty

Associates v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Philadelphia, 657
F.2d 29, 36 (3d Cir. 1981) ("A federal court is bound to consider
its own jurisdiction preliminary to consideration of the
merits.").
The district court's award of attorney fees was
premised on a provision in the Pension Fund Agreement between
Local 542 and Tri-County which provides that in the event of a
lawsuit to collect delinquent contributions the employer "shall
pay all costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred."

App.

133.
In Beckwith Machinery Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815
F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1987), we held that when an award of attorney
fees is based on a contractual provision and is an "integral part
of the contractual relief sought," the order does not become
final and appealable until the attorney fees are quantified.
at 287.

Id.

Accord Vargas v. Hudson County Bd. of Elections, 949

F.2d 665, 670 (3d Cir. 1991) (where attorney fees are sought as
part of damages, and not as prevailing party, the rule of
Budinich v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988), does
not apply and the district court's ruling is not final until the
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amount of fees is fixed); accord SPM Corp. v. M/V Ming Moon, 965
F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1992).
Because the attorney fees awarded in this case were
part of the contractual damages sought by Local 542, the district
court's delay in quantifying the amount of such fees until
February 15, 1995 rendered the earlier order non-final for
purposes of appeal.
This defect was not fatal to Hartford's appeal,
however.

Even though the March 2, 1994 order was not final when

entered, it became final upon entry of the February 15, 1995
order fixing attorney fees and expenses at $19,881.73.

We

therefore exercise our jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and the principle expressed in Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren,
698 F.2d 179, 184-85 (3d Cir. 1983), that this Court may
entertain an appeal from a nonfinal order if an order which is
final is subsequently entered before our adjudication on the
merits.

III.

Alter Ego

Hartford argues on appeal that the district court's
alter ego determination is infected by clearly erroneous
underlying factual findings, and that in any event the district
court misapplied Pennsylvania law to the facts as found.
When considering a district court's state law alter ego
determinations, we review the court's factual findings for clear
error, but exercise plenary review over the legal conclusions it
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draws from those facts.

Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd.,

843 F.2d 145, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1988).

A.
After receiving evidence and taking testimony from
Local 542 members Stanley Stracham and Edward Gilette, TriCounty's president Angela Scarantino, Hartford bond underwriter
John Johnson and claims supervisor Dennis Powers, and Michael
Ragan, administrator of the Funds, the district court found the
following facts:
Tri-County has always maintained appropriate corporate
formalities.

Both Mele and Tri-County are duly authorized

Pennsylvania corporations.

Each filed articles of incorporation,

held regular corporate meetings, kept their own corporate
records, and took care not to intermingle funds.
Tri-County is owned by the three daughters of John
Mele, Mele's president and majority shareholder.

The three Mele

daughters, Angela Scarantino, Beverly Occulto, and Karen
Darbenzio, each also own 11% of the shares of Mele.

The

remainder of the stockholdings in Mele is in the name of John
Mele (53%) and his wife, Catherine (14%).
has filed in bankruptcy.

The Mele corporation

Angela Scarantino is the president of

Tri-County, and Karen Darbenzio was an officer and shareholder of
both Mele and Tri-County.
In addition to Tri-County, there are at least four
other family-owned corporations in the Mele "group": Eleven-7
Corporation, owned by Stephen Scarantino and Bert Occulto,
11

husbands of Angela and Beverly, respectively; John Sal Inc., also
owned by the three Mele daughters; Melback Corp., of which John
Mele is the president, and West Mountain Sand Stone & Aggregates,
Inc., of which Bert Occulto is the president.
Tri-County, which operates from a trailer leased from
Eleven-7 corporation on land owned by John Sal, Inc., owned no
equipment of its own.

For the past twenty years, its sole

function has been to supply operating engineers to Mele.

Tri-

County has undertaken no projects since Mele's demise.
Tri-County has never paid a dividend and was grossly
undercapitalized for the work it had contracted to perform.

As a

result, it became insolvent shortly after Mele stopped payments
on the Viewmont job.
The district court found that Angela Scarantino, TriCounty's president, had little knowledge of the day-to-day
business affairs of Tri-County.

Although the facts are disputed

by Hartford, Scarantino was unable, for instance, to state
whether Tri-County's financial statements were audited or unaudited, or whether Tri-County could make a claim against Mele
under the Bond, or how Tri-County billed Mele for the Viewmont
job.
The district court also found that Mele had treated
Bert Occulto, Tri-County's project manager and husband of one of
the three Mele daughters, as a Mele employee.

More to the point,

Mele enlisted him to participate in the negotiations between Mele
and Hartford regarding the Bond.
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Local 542 members solicited Tri-County jobs at Mele's
offices.

The court also found that John Mele had participated in

Tri-County hiring, and greeted Stracham with the salutation,
"glad to have you working for our company" when Stracham was
seeking Tri-County employment.

The district court concluded that

the only contact Local 542 members had with Tri-County was that
they were paid with Tri-County checks.
When Mele was negotiating the Bond with Hartford,
Hartford requested and received from Tri-County and the other
family-owned corporations indemnification for any payments
Hartford would have to make on the Bond.

The indemnity

effectively precluded Tri-County itself from making a claim on
the Bond.

Moreover, it made Tri-County liable for all debts for

labor and materials incurred by Mele on the Viewmont project,
regardless of whether the debt was owed to Tri-County or another
company.

The district court described this agreement as a

"financial albatross" which no "truly independent" corporation
would assume.

Dist. Ct. Op. 13.

The district court also observed that Mele had
unilaterally proposed to subordinate its $75,000.00 debt to TriCounty to those of other creditors in its proposed plan of
bankruptcy reorganization.

Tri-County has not objected to the

subordination, nor has it made a claim in the Mele bankruptcy.
Finally, the court found that Hartford itself
considered Mele and Tri-County as one company.

Dist. Ct. Op. 12.

Hartford's internal correspondence referred to Tri-County as the
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"union arm of Mele," and Hartford issued credit to Mele on the
basis of composite Mele/Tri-County financial statements.
Hartford challenges a number of these factual findings
as clear error, calling our attention to evidence which it
contends the district court ignored, did not fully take into
account, or evaluated incorrectly.
19 et seq..

See Hartford's Brief at pp.

Hartford also emphasizes that corporate formalities

were scrupulously maintained throughout Tri-County's 23 year
existence, and that there is no evidence of commingling or
siphoning of funds or transfers without adequate consideration.
Under its separate name, Tri-County had been dealing amicably
with Local 542 for over twenty years.

Further, Hartford notes

that the two testifying union employees who supposedly had no
contact with Tri-County beyond receiving their paychecks listed
Tri-County, not Mele, as their employer on their unemployment
claim forms.

Hartford also represented at oral argument that

indemnities like the one given by Tri-County are commonplace in
the construction industry.
We will not find clear error of fact unless a review of
the record leaves us with the "definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made."
564, 573 (1985).

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S.

Although we are troubled by some aspects of the

record, we are not persuaded by Hartford's argument.

Our

independent review of the record does not convince us that the
district court was mistaken or committed clear error in its
factual determinations.
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The dissent, although acknowledging the findings made
by the district court, assesses the evidence differently than did
the district court, and also reads the record differently than do
we.

The dissent concludes that, in its opinion, the district

court was mistaken in its findings.

See Dissent Typescript at 4-

5, 11-13.
Despite the position taken by the dissent, we are bound
to defer to the district court's factfinding if evidence supports
those findings.

Under the clearly erroneous standard, a finding

of fact may be reversed on appeal only "if it is completely
devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or bears no rational
relationship to the supporting data."

Haines v. Liggett Group,

Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1992).

When findings are based on

determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52(a)
demands even greater deference to the trial court's findings.
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575.

Thus, an appellate court may not

substitute its findings for that of the district court, but is
limited to making an assessment of whether there is enough
evidence on record to support such findings.
F.2d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 1988).

Cooper v. Tard, 855

Here, there is more than

sufficient credible evidence to sustain each and every finding
made by the district court.
The district court judge heard the witnesses, assessed
their credibility, and, on the basis of the credible evidence,
made detailed findings to which we are obliged to defer.

Based

on those historical findings, the district court found as
ultimate facts that "the interrelationship between Mele and Tri15

County was such that Mele controlled Tri-County," Dist. Ct. Op.
11, and that Tri-County was "merely an extension of Mele and not
a truly independent corporation . . . ."

Dist. Ct. Op. 17.

The

district court consequently held, relying on the same legal
authorities as does the dissent, that Tri-County was the alter
ego of Mele.
These findings and this conclusion were reached after
full recognition of the arguments on the evidence made by
Hartford.

Giving the appropriate deference to the district

court's findings mandates a holding that no mistake has been
committed.

Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.
True, if we, rather than the district court, were

assigned the task of fact finding, we arguably might have found
the facts differently.

But we are not charged with that task,

and we are satisfied that there being no clear error of fact,
and, as we explain below, no legal error, the district court's
factual findings and its legal conclusion of alter ego should be
upheld.

B.
We also do not find that the district court committed
legal error in holding Tri-County to be Mele's alter ego under
Pennsylvania law.

In Ashley v. Ashley, 393 A.2d 637 (Pa. 1978),

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth, in a formula familiar
to the courts of that state, the following principles which are
to be applied when a trial court disregards corporate forms and,
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"piercing the corporate veil," holds that one individual or
corporation is the alter ego of another:
Th[e] legal fiction of a separate corporate
entity was designed to serve convenience and
justice . . . and will be disregarded
whenever justice or public policy demand and
where rights of innocent parties are not
prejudiced nor the theory of the corporate
entity rendered useless. . .. We have said
that whenever one in control of a corporation
uses that control, or uses the corporate
assets, to further his or her own personal
interests, the fiction of the separate
corporate entity may properly be disregarded.
Id. at 641 (citations omitted).

Pennsylvania courts have largely

embraced the flexible tenor of the Ashley standard, holding, for
instance, that no finding of fraud or illegality is required
before the corporate veil may be pierced, but rather, that the
corporate entity may be disregarded "whenever it is necessary to
avoid injustice."
1987).

Rinck v. Rinck, 526 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Pa.Super.

Accord Lycoming County Nursing Home Ass'n, Inc. v. Com.,

Dept. of Labor and Industry, Prevailing Wage Appeal Bd., 627 A.2d
238, 243-44 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1993).

We have said that Pennsylvania

alter ego law requires a showing that the subordinate company
"acted robot- or puppet-like in mechanical response to the
controller's tugs on its strings or pressure on its buttons."
Culbreth v. Amosa (Pty) Ltd., 898 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1990).
Despite the nominally separate formal existence of TriCounty, the record to which we have referred supports the
district court's findings and conclusion that Tri-County was
Mele's alter ego.

We emphasize, as did the district court, that

Tri-County was willing, at the request of John Mele and Hartford,

17

to indemnify Hartford for any obligations of Mele which might
trigger Hartford's liability under the Bond.

This effectively

merged the obligations of Tri-County and Mele, and prevented TriCounty from making any claim under the Bond.

As a result, Tri-

County has not done so, even though Mele is indebted to it for
over $75,000.
Although it may be true that an indemnity agreement,
standing alone, is insufficient to establish alter ego status,
see United States ex Rel. Global Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. WNH Ltd.
Partnership, 995 F.2d 515, 516-17 (4th Cir. 1993), this fact
alone cannot blunt the impact of Tri-County's general willingness
to sacrifice its own interests for those of Mele.

This view is

confirmed by Tri-County's failure to object to Mele's proposed
plan in bankruptcy proceedings to subordinate Mele's debt to TriCounty to that of all other creditors.
We agree with the district court that the record
reveals a family enterprise divided into formal "divisions" but
nonetheless controlled by the same people -- John Mele and his
family -- and that Mele employed Tri-County to Mele's own
business ends.

Tri-County relied entirely on Mele for its

existence, both financially and operationally.

In function, Tri-

County was nothing more than the "personnel" arm of Mele.

In

light of the district court's findings of undercapitalization,
non-functioning of independent officers, non-payment of
dividends, Tri-County's consequent insolvency, and the
subordination of Tri-County's financial interests to those of
Mele, all of which survive clear error scrutiny, we are satisfied
18

that Local 542 met its burden under Pennsylvania law of showing
that "[Mele] wholly ignored the separate status of [Tri-County]
and so dominated and controlled its affairs that its separate
existence was a mere sham."

Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v.

Intersteel, Inc., 758 F.Supp. 1054, 1057 (W.D.Pa. 1990); accord
Lycoming County Nursing Home, 627 A.2d at 243-44.

C.
Hartford next argues that even if Tri-County and Mele
are alter egos in the traditional sense, it was inequitable for
the district court to hold Hartford liable to Local 542 under the
Bond.

Hartford argues, in essence, that as it is a "third party"

guarantor of Tri-County's obligations to Local 542, Hartford's
bond cannot be reached.

We disagree.

This particular issue has arisen a number of times in
connection with the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270a et seq., and
Pennsylvania courts have relied upon these Miller Act decisions
in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil in non-Miller
Act payment bond cases.

See Lezzer Cash & Carry, Inc. v. Aetna

Ins. Co., 537 A.2d 857, appeal denied, 548 A.2d 256 (Pa.Super.
1988).
The Miller Act (the "Act") requires prime contractors
on any construction contract with the United States exceeding
$25,000 to execute a bond "for the protection of all persons
supplying labor and materials."

40 U.S.C. § 270a(a)(2) (1986).

The Act contains two important restrictions mirrored in many
private payment bonds.

First, Like Hartford's Bond, a Miller Act
19

bond's coverage is limited to "first-tier" subcontractors (such
as Tri-County) and those who contract with them (such as Local
542).

J.W. Bateson Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Board of

Trustees of Nat. Automatic Sprinkler Industry Pension Fund, 434
U.S. 586, 594 (1978).
Second, § 270b(a) of the Act imposes a timely notice
requirement essentially identical to that in Hartford's Bond,
which requires those who contract with first-tier subcontractors,
but not the first-tier subcontractors themselves, to give notice
of their claims within 90 days after they last provided labor or
materials.
These limitations have given rise to cases in which
claimants on a payment bond seek to characterize the party with
whom they contracted as the alter ego of a Miller Act contractor
or subcontractor in order to avoid either the 90 day notice
requirement or the coverage limitation of the Act.

See, e.g.,

Continental Casualty Co. v. United States ex rel. Conroe
Creosoting Co., 308 F.2d 846, 848 (5th Cir. 1962) (claim on
Miller Act bond permitted by supplier of sub-subcontractor when
sub-subcontractor was merely a "shadow" of the subcontractor);
Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Newton Lumber & Mfg. Co., 388 F.2d 66
(10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968)

(when

claimants had negotiated primarily with subcontractor but
contracted with a sub-subcontractor, the sub-subcontractor, whose
principal was a relative of the president of the contractor, was
held to be a "sham" and surety was therefore liable to them on
the bond); National Surety Corporation v. Unites States ex rel.
20

Way Panama, S.A., 378 F.2d 294, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1004 (5th
Cir. 1967) (90 day notice provision not binding on plaintiff when
contractor and subcontractor "operated essentially as one
entity"); United States ex rel. Gilarde Environmental Management
v. Federal Ins. Co., No. 89-1473, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17929
(M.D.Pa. 1990) (same).0
The Fourth Circuit has held that Miller Act sureties
may be reached "where ordinary principles of corporate law permit
the courts to disregard corporate forms."

Global Building

Supply, Inc. v. WNH Ltd. Partnership, 995 F.2d 515, 519 (4th Cir.
1993).

The findings that we have upheld, and the conclusion to

which they lead, have obliged us to hold that Mele and Tri-County
were alter egos under ordinary principles of Pennsylvania law. It
follows that Hartford may be held liable on the bond and, despite
Hartford's argument, we are satisfied that the equities do not
suggest a contrary result.

0

This Court has declined to pierce the corporate veil when there
was "no evidence of familial ties or of any other facts"
suggesting that the contractor and subcontractor had considered
their own contractual relations to be other than "serious and
enforceable obligations." United States ex rel. K & M Corp. v. A
& M Gregos, Inc., 607 F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1979). Gregos, which
recognized the limitations on the right of remote sub-contractors
to sue imposed by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Miller Act in J.W. Bateson Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Board of Trustees, 434 U.S. 586 (1978), also turned on a lack of
evidence that the contractor had been motivated to limit its
liability on the bond. Id. Here, different findings regarding
alter ego have been made. The district court found Mele and TriCounty to be just one company, with strong family ties and with
clear indicia of domination and control. Moreover, it cannot be
gainsaid that Hartford attempted to limit its liability on the
Bond by seeking Tri-County's indemnification.
21

Further, Tri-County's indemnity obviated the very
purpose of the notice provision, which is to remove the risk that
the surety would end up "double-compensating" both
subcontractors, such as Tri-County, and their suppliers, such as
Local 542.

See United States ex rel. Blue Circle West, Inc. v.

Tuscon Mechanical Contracting Inc., 921 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1990).
As the United States Supreme Court explained in J.W. Bateson Co.,
Inc. v. United States ex rel. Board of Trustees, 434 U.S. 586
(1978), bond notice provisions function much like a statute of
repose, "permit[ting] [the surety], after waiting ninety days,
safely to pay [the] subcontractors without fear of additional
liability to sub-subcontractors. . ..

The notice provision thus

prevents both 'double payments' by [sureties] and the alternative
of interminable delay in settlements between contractors and
subcontractors."

Id. at 590-91 n.4 (citations omitted).

also Lezzer, 537 A.2d at 862.

See

Because Tri-County itself could

make no claim against Hartford, this risk was absent from the
outset.
After having treated Mele and Tri-County as essentially
the same company, Hartford cannot now assert Tri-County's
independence as a means of avoiding liability.

The district

court determined that the facts and the equities in this case
required piercing the corporate veil and holding Mele to be TriCounty's alter ego.

We agree.0

0

The dissent claims that "[t]he relationship between Mele and
Tri-County does not deprive Hartford of its status as an innocent
third party." Dissent Typescript at 9. We are confident that
our analysis, which relies on the Miller Act cases and which
22

IV.

ERISA Preemption

Hartford next contends that Local 542's action under
the Bond is preempted by the Employees Retirement Income Security
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 ("ERISA").0

We must also reject this

argument.
A
With several exceptions not relevant here, § 514(a) of
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), "preempts 'any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefits plan' covered by the statute." Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988)
(quoting § 514(a)).
We recently stated that a rule of law "relates to" an
ERISA plan "if it is specifically designed to affect employee
benefits plans, if it singles out such plans for special
treatment, or if the rights or restrictions it creates are
predicated on the existence of such a plan."

United Wire, Metal

and Machine Health and Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hospital, 995 F.2d 1179, 1192 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S.
__, 114 S.Ct. 382 (1993) (footnotes omitted).

leads to Hartford's liability, would be followed by Pennsylvania
courts.
0
We are not persuaded by Local 542's argument that Hartford
failed to preserve its preemption claim for appeal because
Hartford first raised the issue in its proposed findings of fact
after all evidence had been adduced. Accordingly, we address
Hartford's preemption argument on the merits in text.
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In addition, state causes of action which conflict with
ERISA § 502(a) (ERISA's civil enforcement mechanism) are also
preempted.

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54

(1987); see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,
142 (1990).
Although neither party has briefed the issue, we assume
that Local 542 is proceeding at common law as third-party
beneficiary of the surety bond.

See Philadelphia v. Smith

Roofing, 599 A.2d 222, 229 (Pa.Super. 1991).
At the outset, it is clear that the cause of action
relied upon by Local 542 is neither "specifically designed to
affect employee benefits plans" nor "singles out" such plans for
special treatment.

United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192.

Rather, such

common law causes of action are "generally applicable" laws that
"make[] no reference to, [and] indeed function[] irrespective of,
the existence of an ERISA plan."

Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at

139.
Nor is the cause of action "predicated on the existence
of" an ERISA plan.

United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192.

In Ingersoll-

Rand the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted Texas' common
law action against an employer for terminating an employee in
order to avoid paying pension fund benefits.

One of the two

reasons given by the Court for why the Texas action was preempted
was that "in order to prevail [in the cause of action], a
plaintiff [must] plead, and the court [must] find, that an ERISA
plan exists and the employer had a pension-defeating motive in
terminating the employment."

Id. at 140.
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Such a cause of action

"relates not merely to pension benefits, but to the essence of
the pension plan itself."

Id.

(emphasis in the original).

The

Court concluded that "[b]ecause the court's inquiry must be
directed to the plan, this judicially created cause of action
'relate[s] to' an ERISA plan."

Id.

No such inquiry is

necessary in the present action.
Here, the district court need only determine Hartford's
obligations under the Bond.

It need make no inquiry into the

validity or status of the funds (or indeed whether they are ERISA
funds), nor need it explore Hartford's motives regarding employee
benefits.

The fact that the claimant under the bond happens to

be an ERISA fund is not the kind of "critical factor in
establishing liability" that prompted preemption in IngersollRand. Id. at 139-40.0
0

For this reason, Hartford's reference to our decisions in
Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen International Union Local 33
Benefits Funds v. America's Marble Source, Inc., 950 F.2d 114 (3d
Cir. 1991) and 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan v. Nobers, 968 F.2d
401 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 1066
(1993) is inapposite. Bricklayers held that ERISA preempted the
New Jersey Construction Workers' Fringe benefit Security Act,
N.J.STAT.ANN. § 34:11A-1--34:11A-12, which imposed certain
obligations on prime contractors and owners of construction
projects to assure payments owed by subcontractors-employers to
ERISA-regulated fringe benefit funds. The New Jersey statute
challenged in Bricklayers was "specifically designed to affect
employee benefit plans," Bricklayers, 950 F.2d at 118 (quoting
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 829
(1988)), and, as such, was clearly within the preemption
doctrine.
In Nobers, various plaintiffs brought a contract action
seeking damages equivalent to what they would have received under
an ERISA plan had they not been terminated under certain
allegedly improper circumstances. This Court determined,
following Ingersoll-Rand, that the action was preempted because
it "depend[ed] on the existence of an ERISA plan" and "if there
were no plan, there would have been no cause of action." Nobers,
25

Our recent decision in Haberern v. Kaupp Vascual
Surgeons Pension Plan, 24 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir. 1994) is
instructive on this point.

Ms. Haberern's employer made

contributions to her pension plan based on the size of her salary
excluding bonus.

By re-characterizing a portion of her

compensation as a "bonus," the employer effectively reduced the
amount it paid into her pension plan.
this constituted a violation of ERISA.

Ms. Haberern claimed that
The defendant argued that

Ms. Haberern's status as an at-will employee under Pennsylvania
law allowed it to change her compensation at any time.

Ms.

Haberern responded that ERISA preempted Pennsylvania law on atwill employment in this regard.

On appeal, we held that

Pennsylvania's common law presumption of at-will employment
relationships was not preempted by ERISA because the presumption
was "unrelated to the existence vel non of any pension plan." Id.
at 1497.
action.

The very same may be said of Local 542's cause of
Simply because the sums collected may ultimately feed

into an ERISA-governed fund does not in itself mean that the
cause sued upon creates rights or restrictions which are
"predicated on" the existence of an ERISA plan.0
968 F.2d at 406. We find Nobers to be distinguishable. The
state contract action challenged in Nobers was predicated on the
existence of benefits allegedly available to certain employees
under the ERISA plans. Thus, Nobers would have required "a
plaintiff [to] plead, and the district court [to] find, that an
ERISA plan exists" and that the plaintiffs would have been
entitled to benefits under the plan, the very exercise which
prompted preemption in Ingersoll-Rand, 998 U.S. at 140. We need
undertake no such exercise here.
0
Indeed, it should not be overlooked that the damages sought by
Local 542 and ordered to be paid by Hartford include not just
benefit funds, but union dues as well.
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B
Nor is the cause of action asserted here subject to
what we have termed "conflict preemption" under ERISA.

See PAS

v. Travelers Insurance Company 7 F.3d 349, 356 (3d Cir. 1993).
ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were meant to be exclusive.
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 51.

Thus, even a common law cause of

action is preempted by ERISA if it conflicts directly with an
ERISA cause of action.

See Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142.

Together, ERISA §§ 502 and 515 (29 U.S.C. §§ 1132
and 1145, respectively) "provide a cause of action and remedies
for an employer's failure to fulfill its obligations to make
pension or welfare fund contributions pursuant to a plan or
collective bargaining agreement." Bricklayers and Allied
Craftsmen International Union Local 33 Benefits Funds v.
America's Marble Source, Inc., 950 F.2d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1991)
(emphasis added).
Section 3 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5), defines
"employer" as "any person acting directly as an employer, or
indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an
employee benefit plan."

Courts that have considered the matter

have all but unanimously held that sureties do not fall within
this definition. See, e.g., Carpenters So. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. D
& L Camp Construction Co., Inc., 738 F.2d 999, 1000 (9th Cir.
1984) (legislative history of ERISA revealed no Congressional
intent to "expand the concept of employer . . . to include
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sureties, whose obligations are fixed by contract and regulated
by state law for the protection of the public").
The Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that sureties who
are not signatories to the collective bargaining agreement
between the employer and the claimants do not fall within the
ERISA definition of "employer," stating as follows:
The phrase, "in the interests of the
employer" is the operative one here. The
surety does not act indirectly in the
interests of the employer, but rather acts
directly in the interests of employees
damaged by the employer's failure to pay.
Xaros v. U.S. Fidelity and Guarantee Co., 820 F.2d 1176, 1180
(11th Cir. 1987); cf. Laborers Local 938 Joint Health & Welfare
Trust Fund v. B.R. Starnes Co., 827 F.2d 1454, 1457 (11th Cir.
1987); Giardiello v. Balboa Ins. Co., 837 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir.
1988).

But see Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 818

F.Supp. 623, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (rejecting the reasoning of the
Eleventh and Ninth Circuits and holding that a surety qualified
as an employer under ERISA).
We agree with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits that a
surety does not act "in the interest of an employer."

Although

it is true that the surety's services are often purchased by the
employer in order that it may proceed with its business, the
ultimate beneficiaries of that contract are the claimants on the
bond.

The surety does not stand in an employer relationship to

the claimants, nor is it the agent of the employer.

Thus,

Hartford, which is neither the employer of Local 542's operating
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engineers nor acting "in the interests of" their employer, cannot
claim ERISA preemption.

V. Damages
Hartford's final argument on appeal concerns the extent
of its liability under the Bond.

The district court awarded

Local 542 a total of $126,224.11, including $78,794.79 in unpaid
contributions, $5,719.11 in union dues and $42,190.21 in
liquidated damages, all derived from the provisions of the CBA
(Collective Bargaining Agreement) less $480.00 in prepayment.0
The court also awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs of
$19,881.73 according to the terms of the PFA (Pension Fund
Agreement).0

Hartford contends that under Pennsylvania law its

obligations do not extend to payment of liquidated damages and

0

Article VI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement requires the
employer (Tri-County) to make timely fringe benefit contributions
to the Funds of "26.6% of wages" divided up among the various
funds, as well as a Union Check-Off equalling 3.2% of wages.
Section seven of Article VI provides for a surcharge of 20% per
annum or 2% above prime rate, whichever is higher, on certain
late contributions. App. 25.
0
Article VIII, section 1 of the pension fund trust agreement
between the union and the employer provides that:
The Board of Trustees . . . shall have the
right . . . to institute and prosecute . . .
any proceeding at law . . . against any
Employer . . . to collect unpaid
contributions which may be or become due
under this Agreement . . .. Such Employer
shall pay all costs and reasonable attorney's
fees incurred by the Board of Trustees in
connection with any such litigation.
App. 133 (emphasis added)
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attorney fees in the absence of a specific bond provision to the
contrary.

We agree.
Pennsylvania law, at least as announced by that State's

intermediate courts, limits a surety's obligations to those
detailed in the bond itself, Reliance Universal, Inc. v. Ernest
Renda Contracting Co., Inc., 454 A.2d 39, 45 (Pa.Super. 1982),
and not those contained in the agreement between the contractor
and the claimant.

J.C. Snavely & Sons, Inc. v. Web M & E, Inc.,

594 A.2d 333, 336 (Pa.Super. 1991).

Local 542's claims against

Hartford are predicated, at least in part, on Tri-County's
obligations to it under the CBA and the PFA.

Because the Bond

makes no reference to liquidated damages or attorney fees,
Hartford has disavowed any responsibility for these items.
Hartford's bond provides as follows:
[Hartford agrees] that every claimant . . .
who has not been paid in full before the
expiration of a period of ninety (90) days
after the date on which the last of such
claimant's work or labor was done or
performed . . . may sue on this bond for
. . . such sum or sums as may be justly due
claimant. . ..
App. 97.

Hartford is thus obliged to render to Local 542 all

sums which Local 542 is "justly due" for labor.

The district

court reasoned that as Local 542 members would not be "paid in
full" for their labor until all of Tri-County's obligations under
the CBA and PFA (including liquidated damages and attorney fees)
had been satisfied, Hartford must be liable for these items.
Although the parties have pointed us to no decisions of the
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court treating the issues presented here, we
believe that the law of Pennsylvania is otherwise.
As previously noted, the bond is silent as to attorney
fees and liquidated damages, and it is the language of the bond
that is controlling under Pennsylvania law.
question necessarily becomes:
due" for labor?

Thus, the central

What obligations are "sums justly

One answer is that the surety's obligations to

the claimant are co-extensive with those of the employer.

But

this is simply to say that Hartford's obligations are fully
determined by the agreements between Tri-County and Local 542. As
already noted, this has been expressly (and recently) rejected by
Pennsylvania's lower courts.

Such decisions are persuasive

precedent, National Surety Corp. v. Midland Bank, 551 F.2d 21, 29
(3d Cir. 1977), and are "not to be disregarded by a federal court
unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest
court of the state would decide otherwise."

West v. American

Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940).0
0

The district court considered the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Miller Act in United States for the Benefit of Sherman, et
al. v. Carter, et al., 353 U.S. 210 (1957) to be just such
"persuasive data." The Miller Act requires contractors on public
works projects to post a bond covering the "sum or sums justly
due" suppliers of material and labor. See 40 U.S.C.
§ 270a(a)(2). Carter held that "sums justly due" under the
Miller Act included not only delinquent contributions to fringe
benefits funds, but also liquidated damages and attorney fees.
We are not convinced that Carter is apposite in the
present case. First, the Miller Act imposes policy-driven
statutory obligations on the principal and surety which are not
implicated here. Second, this Court implicitly rejected this
view in Knecht, Inc. v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 860
F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1988), which concluded that under Pennsylvania
law attorney fees are not "sums justly due" under a payment bond.
Id. at 80-81. Further, in Carter the parties had expressly
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Nevertheless, it is clear that what Local 542 is
"justly due" turns at least in part on what Tri-County promised
Local 542.

And this will inevitably be determined by reference

to the agreements between them.

Indeed, Hartford does not

contest that Local 542 is "justly due" the fringe benefit
contributions and union dues which are specified in detail in the
CBA.

The question thus becomes what of Tri-County's obligations

to Local 542 are "sums justly due" for labor.
In regard to attorney fees, we have already held that
they are not "sums justly due."

In doing so, we rejected an

argument very much like that proffered by Local 542 and accepted
by the district court.

In Knecht, Inc. v. United Pacific

Insurance Company, 860 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1988), a supplier brought
suit on a surety bond covering "sums justly due," seeking, inter
alia, attorney fees. We stated as follows:
The district judge noted that unless the
[attorney] fees were paid, [the claimant]
would not be made whole. This undoubtedly is
correct but the judge's holding proved too
much, as it is always true that when a
plaintiff must make expenditures for
attorney's fees to recover a debt it will not
be made whole unless its fees are also
recovered. Further, whenever a person is
indebted to another the sum owed may be
regarded as justly due. . . . In fact, we can
hardly conceive of how a bond could be
written to authorize a claimant to sue for
stipulated that liquidated damages and attorney fees were
compensation for labor. 353 U.S. at 220. Finally, whether
Carter can stand for the broader proposition that such sums are
always "justly due" must be questioned in the aftermath of F. D.
Rich Co., Inc. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116 (1974), which held
that an award of attorney fees under the Miller Act would in
ordinary circumstances be an inappropriate abrogation of the
American rule. Id. at 130-31.
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anything less than a sum justly due. We also
observe that in some contracts express
provision is made for recovery of attorney's
fees in the event of an action for breach.
Yet in [the bond] no reference was made to
attorney's fees. In the circumstances, we
conclude that attorney's fees are not
recoverable in this action.
Id. at 80-81.

Since Knecht, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has

held that attorney fees are not sums "justly due."
A.2d at 334-37.

Snavely, 594

As we are unable to discern a meaningful

difference between the present action and the cause of action
asserted in Knecht, we are constrained to reverse the district
court's award of attorney fees.
We must similarly reverse the district court's award of
"liquidated damages," a sum which the CBA refers to as a
"penalty" to be assessed against Tri-County in the event of late
payment of the fringe benefit contributions.0

On at least three

occasions Pennsylvania courts (or courts applying Pennsylvania
law) have rejected the liability of a surety for default
obligations which add some percentage accretion to the underlying
debt.

See Reliance Universal, Inc. of Ohio v. Ernest Renda

0

Section seven of Article VI of the CBA, entitled "Penalty
Clause," provides as follows:
All Fringe Benefits Funds. [P]ayments are
due . . . not later than the 25th of the
month . . .. In the event [of a delinquency
continuing until] the 15th of the next
succeeding month, there will be due . . . a
penalty in the amount of twenty percent (20%)
per annum or 2% above the prime rate,
whichever is higher, of the original
contributions which will be assessed until
the delinquency . . . [is] resolved.
App. 25.
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Contracting Co., 454 A.2d 39, 44-46 (Pa.Super. 1982) (surety on
bond covering cost of "all labor and material used" not liable
for a 1 1/2% "service charge" for late accounts provided for in
contract between contractor and supplier because not part of the
"cost" of labor and materials); Lite-Air Products, Inc. v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 437 F.Supp. 801, 804 (E.D.Pa.
1977) (surety on bond covering "amount due the claimant for such
labor or material" not liable for "finance charges" on late
payments for materials because such charges are more akin to
penalties or damages than they are related to the value of the
materials); J.C. Snavely & Sons, 594 A.2d at 335-37 (surety on
bond covering "sums as may be justly due" not liable for attorney
fees and finance charges accrued under agreement between claimant
and contractor because not detailed in the payment bond).

See

also Salvino Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. Fletcher & Sons, Inc.,
580 A.2d 853, 856 (Pa.Super. 1990) (surety on bond covering
payment to those who have "furnished material or performed or
supplied labor" not liable for delay damages attributable to
contractor because not within the express language of the bond).0
These cases reveal a clear reluctance on the part of
Pennsylvania courts to expand the liability of a surety beyond
the base or essential obligations of the contractor.

Indeed, in

Lite-Air the court declined to hold a surety liable for "finance
charges" for delinquent payments as they were in the nature of a

0

The district court distinguished many of the above-cited cases
on the ground that they involved suppliers of material, not
labor. We are not persuaded by this distinction.
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penalty -- and "penalty" is precisely how the "liquidated
damages" are described in the CBA.

In the absence of an express

provision in the Bond, we conclude that such additional
contractual "charges," "fees" or "penalties" cannot be considered
"sums justly due" and hence are not recoverable from a surety
under Pennsylvania law.

Accordingly, we will reverse the

district court on this ground as well.

VI.
Having considered the record and the arguments of the
parties, we will affirm the district court's March 2, 1994 and
February 15, 1995 orders insofar as they entered judgment on
Count IV against Hartford and in favor of Local 542 for unpaid
contributions and union dues, less prepayments.
We will, however, reverse the district court's orders
insofar as they grant liquidated damages and attorney fees to
Local 542, and we will remand to the district court with
directions that the March 2, 1994 order and the February 15, 1995
judgment be modified to delete all amounts awarded to Local 542
for liquidated damages and attorney fees, consistent with the
foregoing opinion.

Ragan v. Tri-County Excavating, Inc. et al.
Nos. 94-1388 & 95-1189
HUTCHINSON, J., Dissenting.
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I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to
affirm the district court's March 2, 1994 order.

In my view, the

district court erred as a matter of law in piercing the corporate
veil.

This case does not involve exceptional circumstances, nor

demand the use of this extraordinary remedy to impose liability
on Hartford, an independent third-party surety.

Moreover, the

district court's factual findings leave me with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake was committed.

In my opinion, the

Court embraces, contrary to applicable Pennsylvania law, an
overly broad view of the doctrine that permits a court to pierce
the corporate veil in extraordinary cases to prevent fraud or
injustice.

In addition, I believe the Court's holding is likely

to unsettle the reasonable expectations of parties who secure
bonds for the payment of materialmen and suppliers (as well as
others) in construction projects and reduce competition in the
industry.0
Local 542 concedes that it did not give Hartford ninety
days notice of its claims in accord with the bond terms.
Pennsylvania law requires compliance with this type of notice
provision as a condition precedent to recovery on a payment bond.
See Lezzer Cash & Carry, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 537 A.2d 857,
865 (Pa. Super.) ("The notice provision at issue here stated
specifically that written notice within the ninety day period was
a condition precedent to Aetna's liability on the bond.
0

We are

I agree with the Court that Pennsylvania law, not ERISA, governs
this case. I also concur with the Court's conclusion that
Hartford could not be liable for counsel fees or liquidated
damages.
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obliged to enforce the terms of the agreement."), appeal denied,
548 A.2d 256 (Pa. 1988).

Therefore, Local 542 cannot recover

against Hartford unless it can prevail under an alter ego theory.
Pennsylvania law is unclear as to whether the finding
of alter ego is a question of fact or law.

I am not insensitive

to this Court's statement, applying federal law, that "[a]
finding of an alter ego situation is a factual one and must be
supported by the record."0

Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v.

Kenneth R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 283 (3d Cir. 1983)
(citation omitted). More recently, however, we stated:
Assuming that Pennsylvania will permit
recovery on an alter-ego theory on a showing
of injustice, as opposed to fraud or deceit
(a point not yet decided by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court), it is nevertheless plain that
Pennsylvania, like New Jersey, does not allow
recovery unless the party seeking to pierce
the corporate veil on an alter-ego theory
establishes that the controlling corporation
wholly ignored the separate status of the
controlled corporation and so dominated and
controlled its affairs that its separate
existence was a mere sham. See In re Penn
Cent. Sec. Litig., 335 F. Supp. 1026, 1035
(E.D. Pa. 1971); Ashley v. Ashley, 482 Pa.
228, 236-238, 393 A.2d 637, 641 (1978). In
other words, both Pennsylvania and New Jersey
require a threshold showing that the
controlled corporation acted robot- or
puppet-like in mechanical response to the
controller's tugs on its strings or pressure
on its buttons.

Culbreth v. Amosa Ltd., 898 F.2d 13, 14-15 (3d Cir. 1990) (per
curiam); see also Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843
0

This statement, arguably dictum, can be read as standing for no
more than the obvious proposition that every legal conclusion
must have factual support.
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F.2d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 1988).

The Culbreth standard has been

followed by several district courts.

See Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc.

v. Jiffy Lube of Pa., Inc., 848 F. Supp 569, 580 (E.D. Pa. 1994);
May v. Club Med Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 937, 938-39 (E.D. Pa.
1993); Stinson v. GAF Corp., 757 F. Supp. 644, 645-46 (W.D. Pa.
1990).

This suggests to me that the alter ego determination

involves elements of law as well as fact.
In any event, the treatment of two companies as alter
egos is "an extraordinary remedy preserved for cases involving
exceptional circumstances."

Village at Camelback Property Owners

Ass'n, Inc. v. Carr, 538 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 1988), aff'd
per curiam, 572 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1990); see also First Realvest, Inc.
v. Avery Builders, Inc., 600 A.2d 601, 604 (Pa. Super. 1991)
(characterizing the alter ego remedy as "extreme"); Connors v.
Peles, 724 F. Supp. 1538, 1559 (W.D. Pa. 1989) ("The decision of
a court to pierce the corporate veil . . . is to be exercised
reluctantly and cautiously.").

A party attempting to negate the

separate existence of a corporate entity has the burden of
presenting "clear, direct, precise and believable evidence that
the corporate veil should be pierced."

Iron Worker's Sav. & Loan

Ass'n v. IWS, Inc., 622 A.2d 367, 376 (Pa. Super. 1993); see also
First Realvest, 600 A.2d at 604 (party failed to state sufficient
facts to support alter ego theory); Carpenters Health, 727 F.2d
at 284 (burden of proof rests on party attempting to pierce the
corporate veil).
Pennsylvania law considers a variety of factors to
determine whether one corporation is the alter ego of another.
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They include the ignoring of corporate formalities, gross
undercapitalization, a lack of corporate records, non-functioning
officers and directors, non-arms-length transactions between the
corporations, and especially domination and day-to-day control
sufficient to deprive the alter ego of its corporate identity.
See Village at Camelback, 538 A.2d at 533; see also Carpenters
Health, 727 F.2d at 284; United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 88
(3d Cir. 1981).

Before concluding a corporation is the alter ego

of another, the trial court must be able to conclude, based upon
the record, that justice or public policy demands the use of such
an extraordinary remedy, that the rights of innocent parties will
not be prejudiced, and that the theory of the corporate entity
will not be rendered useless.

Lezzer Cash & Carry, 537 A.2d at

861 (quoting Ashley, 393 A.2d at 641).

Absent extraordinary or

unusual circumstances, a court should recognize and maintain the
separate corporate identity.

First Realvest, 600 A.2d at 604;

Reverse Vending Assoc. v. Tomra Systems US, Inc., 655 F. Supp.
1122, 1128 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
In determining whether Tri-County was Mele's alter ego,
the district court expressly found that Tri-County consistently
complied with all corporate formalities.

Despite this finding,

however, it then went on to conclude that the two corporations
were alter egos.

It found:

(1) Tri-County only worked on Mele

projects; (2) Tri-County was grossly undercapitalized; (3)
Hartford treated Tri-County and Mele as one company; (4) TriCounty's president, who was the daughter of Mele's owner, lacked
knowledge of the company's business; (5) Mele assisted in hiring
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Tri-County employees; (6) Tri-County had never paid dividends;
(7) Tri-County's employees only contact with Tri-County was its
name on their paychecks; (8) the two companies' employees were
interchanged; and (9) Mele proposed to subordinate all of its
debt to Tri-County in bankruptcy proceedings without Tri-County's
knowledge or authorization.

Ragan v. Tri-County Excavating,

Inc., No. 92-0066, slip op. at 4-7, 15 (E.D. Pa. March 2, 1994).
I believe the district court's findings are
insufficient to support an alter ego theory.

Put simply, Local

542 failed to meet its threshold burden of showing that Mele
"wholly ignored the separate status of [Tri-County] and so
dominated and controlled its affairs that its separate existence
was a mere sham."

Culbreth, 898 F.2d at 14.

Nor did Local 542

show that Tri-County "acted robot- or puppet-like in mechanical
response to [Mele's] tugs on its strings or pressure on its
buttons."

Id. at 15.

In my opinion, the present circumstances

are not so "exceptional" or "unusual" as to warrant extension of
this extraordinary remedy to force Hartford to pay debts it did
not agree to cover.

See Village at Camelback, 538 A.2d at 533;

First Realvest, 600 A.2d at 604; Lezzer Cash & Carry, 537 A.2d at
861.
I also believe the Court's statement that "no finding
of fraud or illegality is required before the corporate veil may
be pierced, but rather, that the corporate entity may be
disregarded 'whenever it is necessary to avoid injustice,'"
Majority Op. at 16 (quoting Rinck v. Rinck, 526 A.2d 1221, 1223
(Pa. Super. 1987)), is an incorrect statement of Pennsylvania
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law.

The Court in Culbreth did assume that Pennsylvania would

pierce the corporate veil upon a showing of injustice but,
nevertheless, concluded that a party had to make a threshold
showing that the subordinate company was completely controlled
and dominated or "acted robot- or puppet-like."
F.2d at 14-15.

Culbreth, 898

I do not think Local 542 has so shown.

Neither

Rinck nor Culbreth involved an attempt to impose liability on a
third-party through the third-party's dealings with an alter ego.
Though an "injustice" standard is more flexible than a standard
of "fraud," nevertheless, when the corporate veil is pierced
under either standard, the knife is usually pointed at the
shareholder who stands behind the veil, not those who contract
with the shareholder's alter ego.
In reaching its conclusion, I believe the district
court was improperly induced to make Hartford a full participant
in the activities of Mele and Tri-County by its fixation on the
fact that Local 542 was attempting to recover money for pension
and other benefit plans.

During the hearing, for instance, the

district court stated that "nothing is more sacred today in this
country than a pension plan because it's been ignored by too many
people and that's important."
585.

Appellant's Appendix ("App.") at

It also stated that "[t]o preclude recovery on their claim

would have a serious impact on their pensions and health and
other benefits."

Ragan, No. 92-0066, slip op. at 16.

Though

workers' pension rights are important, I think the district
court's decision placed too much emphasis on the persons in whose
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behalf Local 542 sued.

The pension problem should have been left

to ERISA, which we all agree does not apply here.0
In addition to finding exceptional circumstances where
none exist, I believe the district court committed legal error by
utilizing the alter ego theory to impose liability on an innocent
third-party (Hartford).

Ordinarily, courts apply the alter ego

theory to impose liability upon a shareholder who manipulates its
so-called alter ego.
governance.

These cases present issues of corporate

The district court, however, made no distinction

between the issue of corporate governance and the issue of
contract and surety law, which controls this case.

Instead, it

simply treated this matter as one involving the alter ego
doctrine and then used that doctrine to change the text of a
contract between Hartford and Mele.

It allowed Local 542 to

pierce the corporate veil and impose liability on Hartford, a
third-party contracting with Mele in the ordinary course of its
business as a surety, rather than on Mele, the manipulative
corporate shareholder who is responsible for the injustice, if
any, that may be present here.
In doing so, it failed adequately to consider
Pennsyvlania's general rule against piercing the corporate veil
to the prejudice of innocent parties.

See Ashley, 393 A.2d at

641; Lezzer Cash & Carry, 537 A.2d at 861.

0

In Lezzer Cash &

The ERISA issues seem to have dropped out of the case when TriCounty conceded its liability for the pension payments due
Local 542.
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Carry, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania addressed a fact
pattern similar to this one. It stated:
[T]here is no need to pierce the corporate
veil in order to avoid injustice. As to the
corporate enterprises of SGA [principal and
general contractor] and Oreland
[subcontractor], whatever their relationship
may be, both Aetna [surety] and Lezzer
[materialman] are not involved. On the
contrary, both are innocent parties. Aetna
issued a payment bond as requested by SGA and
included therein terms which were
satisfactory to SGA, the principal, and PHP,
the obligee. Lezzer entered a contract to
sell materials to Independence [subsubcontractor], with whom it had been doing
business on prior occasions. It did so with
knowledge of or the ability to learn the
terms of the payment bond which had been
issued by Aetna. As between Aetna and
Lezzer, both innocent parties, there was no
reason to pierce the corporate veils of SGA
and Oreland in order to alter the terms of
the bond which Aetna had agreed to write to
protect designated subcontractors and
materialmen.

Lezzer Cash & Carry, 537 A.2d at 861.
In determining that Hartford was not innocent because
it "considered Mele and Tri-County as one company,"

Ragan, No.

92-0066, slip op. at 12, 16, the district court relied upon TriCounty's indemnity agreement, an internal memorandum from
Hartford that referred to Tri-County as part of Mele, and
Hartford's review of Tri-County's financial statements.

In my

view, this is insufficient to support a finding that Hartford was
not an innocent third-party.

See James E. McFadden, Inc. v.

Baltimore Contractors, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(inter-office memoranda largely irrelevant to alter ego issue);
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Global Building Supply, Inc. v. WNH Ltd. Partnership, 995 F.2d
515 (4th Cir. 1993) (name association insufficient to find one
company is alter ego of other).

As with the surety in Lezzer

Cash & Carry, Hartford issued a payment bond containing terms
agreeable to Mele, not Local 542.

The relationship between Mele

and Tri-County does not deprive Hartford of its status as an
innocent third-party.
In this respect, I recognize Pennsylvania's tendency to
look to federal cases interpreting the Miller Act as persuasive
authority, and I have no quarrel with the principle that
"sureties may be reached 'where ordinary principles of corporate
law permit the courts to disregard corporate forms.'"

Majority

Op. at 21 (quoting Global Building Supply, Inc., 995 F.2d at
519).

However, in Pennsylvania, "ordinary principles of

corporate law" seem to me to preclude use of alter ego doctrine
to impose liability on innocent third-parties.

See Ashley, 393

A.2d at 641; Lezzer Cash & Carry, 537 A.2d at 861.

In

particular, I do not find persuasive those Miller Act cases that
pre-date Ashley and Lezzer Cash & Carry.

See Global Building

Supply, 995 F.2d at 519 (describing pre-Bateson cases as
"arguably" more prove to excuse non-compliance with a bond's
notice provision than those that came after Bateson).
Additionally, I am unable to accept the Court's
conclusion that Hartford (as a third-party surety) can be
compelled to pay because the party "in control of a corporation
uses that control, or uses the corporate assets, to further his
or her own personal interests. . . ."
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Majority Op. at 16

(quoting Ashley, 393 A.2d at 641).
strikes me as obiter dictum.

Such a general statement

At best, it is a truism.

At worst,

if taken seriously, it would permit courts to ignore the fiction
of separate corporate existence at will.

That fiction is one of

proven utility and, in my judgment, essential to the functioning
of a modern free market industrial society.
Finally, I believe the district court not only erred as
a matter of law, but that its ultimate finding that Mele and TriCounty were alter egos is clearly erroneous.

Put somewhat

differently, viewing the record as a whole leads me to a
"definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (internal
quote omitted).
Specifically, Tri-County followed all corporate
formalities and maintained a legitimate set of corporate records.
Although Mele may have participated in Tri-County's management,
there is no clear indication that John Mele or his corporation
dominated and controlled Tri-County to such an extent that it was
a facade or a sham.

See McFadden, 609 F. Supp. at 1105 (mere

participation in management is insufficient).

Further, neither

John Mele nor his corporation owned any stock in Tri-County; nor
can the court attribute a financial interest to John Mele and the
Mele corporation simply because his three daughters were TriCounty's sole shareholders.

Related family corporations often

have common stockholders.
The fact the district court seemed to rely upon most
strongly was the indemnity agreement Hartford demanded from Tri45

County and the Mele family's other corporations.

The record

indicates, though, that Tri-County and its owners reasonably
thought they would benefit financially if Mele obtained bonding
and performed the project.

Thus, I conclude the indemnity

agreement is insufficient to justify the conclusion that TriCounty was Mele's alter ego.
The district court also relied on testimony that some
of Tri-County's employees were interviewed and hired at Mele's
offices.

The record, however, also shows that these interviews

were done by a Tri-County employee, who made the decision to
hire.

Moreover, the testimony to the effect that it was common

knowledge that Tri-County and Mele were the same company can just
as easily be taken as showing that Local 542 dealt with TriCounty with its eyes open.
861.

See Lezzer Cash & Carry, 537 A.2d at

The fact that a Tri-County employee attended a meeting with

Hartford concerning the surety bond does not appear unusual to me
as Hartford was asking Tri-County to indemnify it.
I recognize, of course, that Tri-County's president's
responses to the district court could indicate that she lacked
any detailed knowledge of Tri-County's operations.

The district

court used these responses to conclude that the president was a
mere figurehead.

Many times, however, her answers merely

indicated confusion over the nature of the question and the
district court's manner in asking it.
The district court believed that Tri-County's ignorance
of Mele's proposal to subordinate Tri-County's debt in its
bankruptcy proceeding was significant.
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I fail to see how a

"unilateral" offer by Mele to subordinate its debt to Tri-County,
without Tri-County's knowledge, is evidence of Tri-County's
participation in abuse of the corporate form warranting
application of the alter ego doctrine.
The district court's conclusion that Tri-County only
worked on projects with Mele is not borne out by the record.

The

district court's belief that Tri-County was grossly
undercapitalized ignores the economic reality that it had
operated successfully for twenty-three years.

So, too, Tri-

County's failure to pay dividends strikes me as nothing unusual
for family corporations whose owners are acquainted with our
income tax laws.
On the other hand, the undisputed fact that there was
no commingling of funds and Tri-County was not recently
incorporated indicate, along with their observance of corporate
formalities, that the separate corporate existence of Mele and
Tri-County should not be ignored.

Taking all these facts

together, I am unable to conclude that Local 542 produced
evidence that is clear, precise and convincing enough to warrant
piercing the corporate veil.
Accordingly, I would reverse the district court's
judgment in all respects.
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